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Book Reviews
Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals, 253pp, Black Rose
Books, Montreal, New York, London, 1997.
It is good to see the reissue/revised edition of this important book, which
should be more widely known than it is. As the most detailed and
systematic critique available of the pervasive assumptions of humancenteredness that affect the treatment of animals in science and popular
scientific culture, Beyond Boundaries should be on the reading list of every
course that deals with animal issues or the human-animal interface. Beyond
Boundaries is a small book that is accessible and not too intimidating for
students, but still manages to cover a remarkable amount of ground,
skilfully blending philosophy and empirical studies. New postscripts
update the readings and sketch an unerringly radical course that navigates
astutely between various hazards, for example the issue of whether animals
should be of concern as individuals or as species. Some influential
ecofeminist critiques of the treatment of animals focus heavily on hunting
and masculinity, but Nose’s book, although still identifying as ecofeminist,
strikes a much better balance, naming capitalism as well as patriarchy as
the problem.
The book opens with a brilliant critique of animal commodification of the
contemporary ‘animal industrial complex’ which brings out significant
parallels between rationalising scientific management of human workers
and that of animal workers, the latter of course being far more ruthless. An
impressively comprehensive historical chapter on the devaluation of nature
and animals in the west then sets the scene for Noske’s discussion of
human-animal continuity and locates the cultural sources of the pervasive
mechanism that continues to frame most scientific approaches to the
continuity question. This chapter includes very useful critiques of both
Marx and Darwin, as major figures who where obliged to come to terms
with the interrelatedness of humanity and animality, which argue that
neither of them were able to overcome the subject-object approach. The
next chapter builds on this to develop a major critique of sociobiology and
other schools of animal investigation that neglect the individuality,
subjectivity and autonomy of animals and reduce the types of explanations
sought to the deterministic and mechanistc form that is usually taken to
represent the ‘biological’. In this and the following chapter on discontinuity
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Noske exposes in detail common fallacies in the treatment of animal
communication. The concluding chapter presents a vision for a science of
animals that is much more like anthropology, aiming to recognise the
subjectivity of animals and meet them on their own ground instead of
expecting them to perform according to human standards, escaping the
‘dilemma...that there seems to be no option to imposing on animals either
object status or human subject status’ through recognition of positive
otherness. Beyond Boundaries is essential for anyone wanting in on this
project and its sophisticated philosophical insights are crucial for
developing more self-critical knowledge frameworks essential for doing
any good work on humans, animals or the human-animal boundary.

Val Plumwood

Gary L. Francione, Rain without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights
Movement, xii + 269pp, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1996.
Francione mounts a convincing argument that much of the ideology or
theory behind the contemporary movements in support of animals is
confused and that there are weaknesses in the animal welfare approaches
which will always put a lid on change. It took me a while to get into
Francione’s way of thinking as the key argument is peppered with much
personal accusation which is distracting, especially if not all the figures are
known to the reader. However this is not a side issue for Francione as these
are the figures who are producing the muddled thinking.
About a third of the way into Rain without Thunder I came to accept his
argument against his opponents but I am not totally convinced of all
aspects of his positive view. I make these personal references because I
believe the book is important but the tone may put some readers off
especially in the beginning. Persist.
Who are Francione’s opponents? Those who support animal welfare, even
those who support animal welfare as a means of eventually bringing about
animal rights. Animal welfarists take their main task to be the alleviation of
pain and suffering. Francione argues firstly that they are not very successful
in this aim. Most of the national organisations looking out for the interests
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of animals, at least in the US, are dominated he claims by a welfarist
approach. Animal welfare is encoded in legislation and regulation. Yet
animals suffer more now than one hundred years ago. The rearing of
animals for food has moved more into intensive farming practices which
generate greater suffering than previous practices. Animal experimentation
is getting worse with genetic engineering and cross-species transplants
presenting ‘new and arguably worse threats to animals in terms of pain and
suffering’ (p.115). He states that there is no evidence that animal
experiments in general are decreasing or that there has been a significant
drop in the number of painful experiments without analgesics or
anaesthesia. Hunting continues. Furs are still worn and so on.
Francione does not discuss the European experience which reveals greater
gains, especially on hunting, on battery chickens and on cosmetic
experimentation using animals. It would help in evaluating Francione’s
argument to ascertain whether the welfarist approach is as dominant in
Europe as the US. I suspect not. 3
Secondly Francioni argues that it is simply inconsistent to claim to support
a long term goal of animal rights by pursuing an animal welfare agenda in
the short term. This is because an animal rights view rejects the treatment of
animals as means to human ends, but a welfare position accepts that they
can be means to human ends, so long as the ends are ‘significant’ and the
treatment is ‘humane’. Francione acknowledges that different
interpretations may be put on these two terms, so that on the one hand
those who exploit animals might be said to adopt an animal welfare
position or on the other hand, there are those who make serious attempts to
limit what counts as ‘significant’. Here he cites Robert Garner’s book,
Animals, Politics and Morality as presenting the most progressive analysis.
Even Garner’s position is unsatisfactory for Francione however as it does
not oppose all uses of animals as means for human ends.
It is the rejection of this use of animals or put another way, the rejection of
the property status of animals which Francione sees as the key element of
the animal rights approach and the only way to improve the lot of animals.
While animals are regarded as the property of humans a conflict between
them ‘is identical to that between a person and her shoe’ (p.127) He draws
the analogy between animals and slaves and notes that concern about the
See Nichola Taylor, ‘Wither rights? Animal rights and the rise of new
welfarism?’ Animal Issues, 3,1, (1999), pp. 27-41.
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welfare of slaves was quite a different matter from attempts to abolish the
practice. This does not mean that it was inappropriate for people to show
compassion for slaves, or for instance to give them water, but that welfarist
campaigns on the part of slaves were unlikely to be important in ending the
practice. This contrast between working for welfare and working for the
end of exploitation has surfaced recently in Australia with the concerns
about collusion in an unjust practice which trouble members of animal
ethics committees who are there as animal guardians.
Francione is quite right to point out that Singer has confused the debates by
defending a philosophy which does not call into question the property
status of animals and using rights talk as a political slogan. (I would not go
so far as to agree however that Singer is caught in a welfare position. 4)
Francione sets up a contrast between animal welfare and animal rights as
an exclusive one. This is incorrect. There are positions which could be
characterized by neither perspective 5 but putting that to one side, what
merits are there in his positive view? He claims that an animal rights
philosophy is not utopian. There is little possibility of achieving its aims
quickly but there are various incremental changes in line with the rights
philosophy which are realizable eg. refusing in one’s own practices to be
involved in the exploitation of animals as much as is possible, involvement
in education, protests, demonstrations, boycotts and campaigns, usually
outside the legislative and regulative processes. The latter rider is added as
changes within these processes would most likely be simply reforms in
institutional exploitation. Such reforms would carry the assumption that it
is acceptable to violate animal rights in the short term which he of course
rejects. Short term aims (ie. aims short of the abolition of animal
exploitation) could involve various prohibitions, eg. making the use of
animals in drug addiction experiments illegal, the Great Ape Project
(removal of all chimpanzees, orangutans and gorillas from all exploitation),
an absolute prohibition of animal use for product testing or in drug
addiction studies, the elimination of battery cages, and the prohibition on
dehorning of animals.

See An Interview with Peter Singer, Animal Issues, 1,1, (1997), pp.37-44.
See for instance Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals (Black
Rose Books, Montreal, 1997) reviewed above.
4
5
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Francione relies on Tom Regan’s theorizing 6 to give substance to his rights
philosophy. This is where I start to part company. The argument against
the limitations of a welfarist approach is well put and the plea to drop the
property status of animals is well made and can be sustained by appealing
to the intrinsic value of animals without adopting a rights position. One
doesn’t need to take that extra step.
The foundation for according intrinsic value to animals is not sufficiently
well worked out in Regan’s book. Francione skips over this problem by
simply referring to Regan’s notion of ‘subject-of-a-life’ without going into
further details. This is the concept which Regan uses to claim that animals
have intrinsic value and to be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual who
has beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future with
feelings of pleasure and pain; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of one’s
desires and goals and an individual welfare in the sense that one’s
experiential life fares well or ill for one. 7 Does this apply to a chicken?
Probably not, yet Francione is certainly putting an argument for stopping
the exploitation of chickens if not all animals. Also this description accords
value to aspects of life which humans value. Perhaps or even most likely,
animals value life in a different way. Regan’s criteria have a rationalistic,
anthropocentric ring.
Regan argues for animal rights on the basis of their inherent value.
However the rights talk comes across as somewhat superfluous. He doesn’t
introduce the notion until near the end of his theorizing and drops it in his
summing up. There are notorious problems with notions of rights such as
how to deal with conflict between different rights and if there is no way of
enforcing them appeals to rights can be empty. Francione interweaves his
discussion of rights more into his theorizing but I am not convinced that a
lot would be lost if he dropped it.
Rain without Thunder is a very rigorously argued clarification of some key
points in contemporary theorizing about animals. The rain could be tears
(compassion), the thunder, significant change (justice).

Denise Russell
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, (University of California Press, Berkeley,
1983)
7 Ibid., section 7.5.
6
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